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Civilian Nuclear Power:
Economic Issues and Policy Formafion
By
PHILIP MULLENBACH
New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1963.
Pp. xiv, 406, $8.50
This excellent book is required reading primarily for three
groups, none made up principally of economists. The appellation
"required" is justified because the book is a fine survey in some
depth of the basic policy issues involved in assimilating one of our
newest technologies, civilian nuclear power, into an already complex,
industrial society. Although new developments can make such books
quickly out of date, the value of this one remains substantially intact.1 The only development seriously affecting the analysis and
recommendations made by Mr. Mullenbach was the announcement
in 1964 of the so-called Oyster Creek Reactor Project in New
Jersey, which the proposers claim will produce economically competitive electrical power.' Even this does not undermine his basic conclusions.
Mr. Mullenbach attempts, successfully in this reviewer's opinion,
to describe and analyze what the author calls the economic policy
questions which did in the past and will continue to face the federal
government in the development of non-military nuclear power
plants. His coverage of issues is catholic and his treatment of them
is sufficiently thorough and open-minded. As indicated in the final
chapter, Mr. Mullenbach does have a particular point of view to
espouse and which the readers should keep in mind, i.e., the federal
government should take a much more active role in supporting the
development of civilian nuclear power if the United States is to
realize the full potential of nuclear power with reasonable speed. In
spite of this predilection, the author is disarmingly objective in his
1. Although, as pointed out later, the data used by the author are a little out of
date, his conclusions do not rest upon precise accuracy of economic material. Nucleonics, July 1964, pp. 56-72, brings the economic and technical data for power reactors
up to date.
2. For a report of the public argument about the present economics of nuclear power
and the validity of the claim for economic electrical power from the Oyster Creek
reactor see Nuclear Industry, Sept. 1964, p. 18.
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analysis of the problems and value judgments which face federal
officials in this area. The author's description and analysis not only
of the issues and value judgments themselves, but of the processes
by which federal policy was arrived at, also has the ring of authority
and first hand knowledge which comes from his service as an economist with the Atomic Energy Commission until the late 1950's. Actually, it is his insight into the process of policy making in this area
that makes his work so attractive.
Although Mr. Mullenbach is an economist and purports throughout the book to be dealing with economic policy questions, an academic lawyer with de minimis training in economics but with considerable interest in the legal problems of nuclear energy feels safe
in asserting that this book is not written for the economist, and in
fact probably is not primarily of interest to that group. Speaking
with the blithe confidence of the uninformed, the reviewer suspects
that the trained economist would find nothing startling in the book.
Mr. Mullenbach has not made, and in fact does not purport to make,
any significant contributions to economic theory. Nevertheless, the
book does make a significant contribution to a number of other
groups.
The first group is limited but varied, including those with a
particular interest in the subject matter of nuclear energy. Economists, administrators, and lawyers in the federal government who
influence federal nuclear policy certainly should read the book. This
includes those in the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, and the Executive Office who participate in such decisions.
Every member of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy also should read the book personally, not just have it summarized by some staff member. Presumably top management in the
nuclear industry will read the book personally and with care.
Another group for which the book is of great value includes
economists, lawyers, and others who are primarily interested in
natural resources and the formulation of a realistic national policy
concerning them. For this group, the book is not just "required"
reading in the normal academic sense of one you ought to read but
failure to do so will not necessarily result in Qunking the course; it
is imperative reading because you do flunk the course if you do not
read it. This imperative recommendation is made not because this
reviewer agrees with all of Mr. Mullenbach's conclusions, but because the problems he discusses are important and his analysis should
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shed considerable light on what policies have been followed in the
nuclear energy field at both the domestic and international level.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the book will be to a
third group of persons, those interested in the processes by which
the federal government reaches policy decisions on important matters involving scientific as well as economic and legal complexities.
Although Mr. Mullenbach makes a very important contribution in
the area of nuclear power development policy, his most important
contribution is in his description and analysis of the process by which
these important policy decisions were made, or perhaps in some
cases fallen into, with both good and bad results. Although the
book naturally has some economics and nuclear energy jargon, the
author uses remarkably little, and any intelligent person should have
no difficulty in reading and comprehending the problems Mr. Mullenbach is presenting. This book is about the general problem of
policy formation in the federal government as to important technological developments significantly affecting the economic welfare
of the country and its posture on the international scene. At least,
that is the most important impact the book had on this reviewer.
In spite of this enthusiastic endorsement of the book to the groups
indicated, two specific cautions should be mentioned. The first is directed to the person with considerable sophistication in the nuclear
energy area. The expert who plans to read the book cover to cover,
as he should, may be discouraged by Chapters I and II. Don't be
tempted to stop-read on. To this reviewer, Chapter I was rather
dull in two respects. There is nothing particularly new in what
amounts to a summary of the problems and a statement of the
questions that are presented in the nuclear energy field. In addition,
although Mr. Mullenbach has a readable, straightforward style of
writing, it is not spritely, and he makes no attempt to dramatize or
summarize his own ideas about these matters, though he does reveal them in later chapters. The expert can skim Chapter I.
For somewhat different reasons, Chapter II, which deals with
reactor technology and economic policies, might also dissuade the
knowledgable person from finishing the book. The treatment of
the technology of reactors is extremely brief and canvasses only the
most obvious possibilities. This is particularly true as to the potential
uses for nuclear energy other than the production of electrical
power. Likewise, the author's treatment of fuel reserves is extremely brief. He goes into somewhat more detail in describing th'e
cost of electrical energy produced by a nuclear reactor, but there is
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a difficulty with this material that also runs through this whole
chapter and might be a serious defect in the whole book, although
in the ultimate analysis it probably is not. This has to do with the
timeliness of the information used by the author. Quite aside from
the cut-off date of the summer of 1962 stated in the preface,' most
of the references the author makes to technology and to the
economics of fuel supply -and cost of electricity are to studies published in the late 1950's. Major dependence is placed upon informa.
tion presented at the two Geneva conferences in 1955 and 1958. Although not a specialist in this area, the reviewer has some doubts as
to the accuracy of the conclusions on these technical matters reached
by the author on the basis of somewhat old data.
One also certainly could wish for a more thorough development
of the economics of enriched as against natural uranium fuel economy than can possibly be included in a two-page discussion.4 Then,
to relegate the question of the production of weapon grade material without making use of nuclear power electrical generating
facilities to one page, and to do the same with the question of social
costs, seems somewhat cavalier at best."
In spite of these first two chapters, this reviewer is still enthusiastic about the book, and recommends it highly to the three groups
mentioned at the beginning. This seems justified from the conclusion
which the author reaches, and with which this reviewer agrees, that
the economics and technology of nuclear power for peaceful uses are
so much in the borderline area that the basic policy decisions have to
be made on grounds other than pure technology or for purely economic reasons. Important questions in this area are decided by
projections into the future which necessarily are uncertain. Yet
nuclear power potential justifies the author's conclusion in Chapter
III, that in making policy decisions in this area, we should ignore
the question of whether normal sources of power such as fossil fNels
and hydroelectric developments will permit the utility companies to
7
sell electricity for lower, higher, or the same prices as now charged.
Certainly within the next ten years, even with the announcement of
the economically competitive reactor to be built at Oyster Creek, it
is perfectly clear that it is touch and go whether nuclear energy
3. P. x.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Pp. 73-74.
P. 76.
Pp. 77-78.
P. 88.
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can be economically competitive. This does not reduce the need in
the mind of the author, or this reviewer, for development of nuclear
power for civilian uses, although, as the author indicates, ultimately
the development of nuclear energy for producing power is dependent upon how competitive it becomes.8 The picture is fairly
clear that in the long run this will be the case, and that it is important to this country as well as to the world generally that this new
source of energy be produced. The principal question concerns the
speed with which the development should be carried out. This conclusion again is reached by the author on the basis of tables which
for the most part are five to ten years old. But the basic conclusions
which he reaches in his later discussions of the policy questions seem
justified on the basis of any reasonable variations one might assume
in the technical and economic premises accepted in Chapters II and
III. Only the timing would be affected.
The author's most important contribution in Chapter III is
bringing into sharp focus the role of privately owned electric power
utilities who wanted to avoid another TVA project in the nuclear
energy area, 9 and also the role of the equipment manufacturers who
are competing with each other for the very limited business available as yet. 10 He makes some passing mention of the impact of the
nuclear energy patent policy and the monopoly restraints found in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," but he really makes no contribution to an analysis of these two questions. 12 In fact, he probably is
wrong as to one constitutional question." In spite of these deficiencies, this part of Chapter III is the first significant contribution by
the author to an understanding of the forces that entered into
formulation of United States nuclear energy policy during the last
fifteen years.
Mr. Mullenbach begins his most significant contributions with
Chapters IV and V, where he explores the various United States
8. P. 97.
9. Pp. 103-05.
10. P. 106.
11. 68 Stat. 919 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2394 (1958).
12. P. 108; see also ch. 5.
13. The author states that "An inventor's seventeen-year right to his patent is a
property right authorized by the Constitution." P. 159. He seems to be saying that
the Constitution grants this right and while this has been argued by some lawyers most
constitutional scholars feel that the constitutional clause is only a grant of power to
Congress which it can exercise or not as it sees fit. Perhaps this is what Mr. Mullenbach meant when he used the word "authorized" but in context it seems to say the
Constitution itself grants a property right.
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programs and the economic policies underlying them. Even the
experts should start reading carefully here. The author makes the
point that the productive capacity needed for military purposes
now constitutes a serious threat to the nuclear industry because we
have a staggering supply of material which makes it difficult for
private industry in many ways.' 4 He then mildly criticizes the AEC
for paying incentive prices for uranium ore and plutonium."5 He
follows these assertions with a conclusion that it is necessary to accelerate the development of a civilian nuclear industry in order to
support the uranium production industry !"° This startling assumption apparently is carried over into the author's conclusion in the
last chapter that the government's assistance program should be
accelerated to assure rapid development of the nuclear industry.
Although the statement did not seem particularly startling to Mr.
Mullenbach, surely the underlying assumption should not go unchallenged. The reality of the problem for the uranium production industry is clear, as shown not only by the material in this book, but
also by the President's announcement in 1964 that production of
fissionable material would be significantly curtailed. 17 Our capacity
for producing uranium and fissionable material far exceeds any
reasonable civilian (and apparently military) needs during the
next decade or so. The author never makes clear, however, just why
we should engage in the bootstrap operation of encouraging a
growth in nuclear power so as to keep the uranium and thoruim
mining industry solvent.
In these two chapters the author demonstrates that the AEC's
pricing policies as to ore and fissionable material in effect constituted
important policy decisions affecting significantly the growth and
future of the nuclear industry.' As the author indicates, almost all
of these decisions have been cloaked in secrecy so that it is very
difficult to determine just what economic policy decisions are incorporated in these prices. Although there has been a government subsidy, at least in the past, it is impossible to determine the amount of
the subsidy. Mr. Mullenbach's discussion of pricing policy makes a
persuasive case for stripping such decisions of their cloak of secrecy,
although he only hints at the need for this change.' 9 In the light of
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Pp. 114-18.
P. 121.
P. 122.
Atomic Industrial Forum Memo, Jan. 1964, pp. 3-5.
He summarizes the policy questions at p. 144.
P. 181.
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recent world developments, particularly Red China's detonation of
an atomic bomb and our cutback in production, we have practically
nothing to gain by maintaining secrecy, and we do lose much by
way of public scrutiny of AEC decisions in this area. This is not to
suggest that the decisions have been made wrongly, but only that
the public has a right to know and, if necessary, to criticize. So long
as these decisions are hidden in secrecy, even informed members of
the public cannot offer intelligent, constructive criticism.
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII deal with United States civilian
nuclear power developments as they affect other countries and, therefore, our own foreign policy. This material makes clear what most
informed people have said so often, that there is very little in
civilian nuclear power of any immediate consequence for the socalled developing countries, with the possible exception of India
and Brazil. His summary of the addition which nuclear fuels can
make to the total world energy reserves20 is old stuff but useful to
prove his point. He concludes, however, that Western Europe, the
U.S.S.R., and Japan certainly are on the verge of needing nuclear
fuel, if for no other reason than to achieve some independence from
fossil fuels.
The discussion of the programs followed by the various countries
which might well make use of nuclear power is brief but sufficient.
His discussion of debt servicing charges 2' and capital costs 22 is a
very real contribution to non-economists. A good case is made for
countries such as India going to enriched fuel reactors, even though
they want to be free of the need to depend upon the United States
for their fuel, and, therefore, have been most interested in the
natural uranium reactors. The demonstrated abundance of uranium
throughout the world and the existence of competition between
various reactor types and of countries who are capable of producing
reactors surely should convince most of these countries that they
have little to fear. Here again, the necessity of secrecy in establishing our prices undoubtedly contributes to the fear of these other
countries. Such fears might not be so great if the basis upon which
the prices were determined was made public.
Chapter VIII describes the general objectives of American foreign policy, past and present, and points to a frequent lack of coordination between the AEC, the Executive Office, and the State
20. Pp. 197-98.
21. P. 232.
22. Pp. 233-35.
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Department, such as occurred in preparation of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech in 1953.23 Certainly it is clear to
anybody who has studied the field that the State Department has
not been very enthusiastic about the main idea of Atoms for Peace,
i.e., establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Clearly, that organization has not achieved the purpose which Eisenhower had in mind. The author nevertheless states that the greatest
hope for the IAEA is that it will prevent diversion of material
from peacetime operations to military uses.24 To this reviewer, there
is grave doubt as to the efficacy of the IAEA or our bilateral power
agreements as devices for controlling the nuclear arms race. As the
author himself points out, a country does not need a large power
reactor program to produce fissionable material for bombs. 25 Although secrecy shrouds its development, one keeps seeing references
to the centrifuge method of producing fissionable material. Here
again, secrecy prevents the public from evaluating foreign policy
decisions which may be unrealistic. If the rumors of very cheap production are true, the whole role of the IAEA in attempting to
prevent diversion of fissionable material made available through
that agency may become a most useless gesture. To this reviewer, at
least, it seems likely that nuclear arms must be controlled by a direct
approach through an international agreement, and one which must
include Red China. Hopes to achieve enforcement by the IAEA or
through our bilateral agreements very likely are misguided, although our foreign policy planners and Mr. Mullenbach still assume
otherwise. The real problem is whether a country wants to commit
its resources to the development of military weapons, and not
whether the country can get some secret or some material from the
established nuclear powers. Surely, additional powers besides the
United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, and Red
China will develop a capacity for building nuclear bombs in the next
ten years, if they want to. It is doubtful that the bilateral agreements limitations or the IAEA system of control will seriously
affect this possibility. If that is the case, one has to ask the question
of whether a great deal of trouble and time has been spent on something that basically is useless.
At the end of Chapter VIII, the author concludes that the emphasis in United States foreign policy should shift to the less de23. Pp. 263-69.
24. P. 282.
25. Pp. 282-83.
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veloped countries,2" but is this not basically incompatible with the
author's earlier stated conclusions 27 that for nearly all cases nuclear
power does not make economic sense except in Western Europe and
Japan? Our foreign policy should be changed to make the IAEA
what it has in effect become, an international assistance agency, not
an international inspection group.
In Chapters IX and X, Mr. Mullenbach attempts to reconcile
the various policies followed by the federal government in both the
domestic and international areas, and he reaches the conclusion that
the AEC has been too slow in developing nuclear power because it
has depended too much upon the private utility and equipment manufacturing industries rather than upon a more urgent government
program of research and development. 2 He then says that the real
success of our program depends upon the development of competitive power. He concludes that there will continue to be a need for
public "venture" capital in order to develop the program rapidly, 29
although he had pointed out earlier that there really was no immediate need for development of this power source. He makes these
assertions even though he is critical of the government's pricing
policies which he feels have included a subsidy. 30 The only objection
to using prices as a method of subsidizing is that it perhaps hides the
exact amount of the subsidy, but this depends entirely upon whether
or not secrecy surrounds the area.
He also raises a very interesting possibility, although apparently
inadvertently, when he discusses the impact of federal policy as to
oil imports.3 1 He states that the usual justification of this policy is
preservation of domestic supplies for purposes of national security
in case of future wars. The same argument he suggests for Europe
adopting nuclear power to diversify its fuel and energy sources is
perhaps equally applicable to the United States. If nuclear power
does provide this kind of emergency reserve, then this would
seriously affect the arguments that have been made to support the
oil import controls. Obviously, imports have been controlled not so
much for national security reasons, but to protect the domestic oil
producers. Here again is a beautiful example of the mixture and
sometimes indirect impact on basic economic policies which are hid26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

P. 295.
Pp. 216-27.
P. 316.
P. 326.
Pp. 326-34.
P. 336.
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den in the interstices of other policy decisions purportedly based
upon other grounds.
Finally, he concludes that the TVA and Bonneville authorities
should get into the nuclear power field because they have shown
how to produce low cost power.3 2 He makes this assumption without any reference whatsoever to the arguments that have been made
to the contrary by private power groups.
In spite of these doubts about some of the arguments used and
conclusions reached by Mr. Mullenbach, to this reviewer the total
picture is one of continued need for fairly rapid development of
civilian nuclear power and, undoubtedly, this will for some time demand continued government support, at least through research and
development assistance. It is in the highlighting of these basic policy
issues which are involved in the nuclear energy program that Mr.
Mullenbach makes a real contrbiution.
The most significant contribution of the book, however, is as a
case study of the problems which a society such as ours faces when a
new technology is presented for assimilation. This study shows that
assimilation does not take place automatically but rather that mistakes will be made and can be minimized only if plans are made in
advance to meet the new problems which will be created by any new
technology. It points up dramatically how technology and national
policy become enmeshed with each other and make it difficult for
government policy makers and those who scrutinize their decisions
to understand the policy and value judgments involved and to reach
conclusions as to which ones should be accepted. This is a wonderful
case history of just such a problem. One can only hope that similar
studies will be made of other technologies such as space, and soon,
oceanography. Whether or not one agrees with all the conclusions
drawn by the authors of such studies, it is important that serious
attention be given to the assimilation problems which are inherent
in all such developments.
SAMUEL D. ESTEP*

32. Pp. 340-41.
* Professor, The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor.

